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Introduction
When Epeli Hau’ofa launched this lecture series some weeks back, he also
launched as a theme of this series the idea of the ocean as a uniting force.
As a region we are joined together and bound together by the ocean. I
remember thinking, while listening to Epeli’s lecture, that this applies not
just the waters of the ocean, but also what they hold; in particular I thought
of the tuna that swim from one end of the Pacific to the other. And thinking
in these terms, I wondered to myself, where do the boundaries of this ocean
region begin and end?
The country I focus on tonight, Japan, is an island country bordering
the Pacific ocean and having a fish eating tradition. It is a country that in
modern times has been the biggest fishing nation in the Pacific (and in the
world) and it continues to be the largest market for the region’s fresh tuna.
Because of this role, and because of the interaction of tuna stocks in the
north and south Pacific and across national boundaries, Japan can also claim
to be a custodian of the resource.
But Japan is not normally regarded as part of the Oceania that Epeli
referred to. In the history of Japan’s relations with the Pacific island
countries, the ocean has in fact been a contested area. And ownership of the
Pacific’s tuna—so valuable to both Japan and the  island states—continues
to be a highly contentious issue.
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What I will argue in this paper is that for most of the postwar era,
Japan had virtually unchallenged access to the region’s fishing grounds.
Even after independence came and the era of 200-mile Exclusive Economic
Zones dawned in the 1970s, Japan managed, through its aid policy and its
sheer economic weight in the region, to continue to enjoy cheap, unimpeded
access. The corollary to this was that the Pacific island countries saw
very little economic returns on what for many was their only resource of
consequence.
But this situation began to change—and I date that change to a point ten
years ago. What I see is a shift in the balance of power in favour of the
Pacific island countries in their dealings with Japan. This shift has meant
that the region is now, to a much greater extent, calling the shots, and what
I want to consider later in this lecture is how far regional strategies and
collective action by the Pacific island countries are resulting in greater
economic benefits to them from Japan’s fishing activities in the region.
Why is this important?
The question of the balance of power and who gets what economic benefits
is important for at least two reasons. In the first place, it points to the value
of regional or collective diplomacy for the Pacific island states, at a time
when some states are beginning to perhaps question its utility. I think Pacific
island states have long held mixed feelings about the value of regionalism:
at the last South Pacific Forum meeting in the Marshall Islands the theme
was ‘Regional Solidarity for the Common Good?’ (emphasis on the
question mark). It is no longer being taken for granted or assumed that
regionalism is of value in its own right.
Secondly, and at risk of sounding over-dramatic, the stakes in the area
of fisheries diplomacy are enormous. What is at stake is the future of the
tuna resource (recognised as the world’s last remaining undepleted stocks
of commercial tuna). This also represents our future livelihood. Managing
this resource is a huge responsibility but it is not something we can do on
our own—either individually or as a group of island countries. We need to
work together with the fishing powers like Japan. And therein lies the
challenge: Japan is not recognised as part of ‘our’ Oceania. But in the future
it may be necessary to treat it is as such. This of course raises many
questions and concerns.
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Background
My interest in Japan–Pacific island fisheries relations began with my
doctoral research on Japan’s aid to the Pacific islands. As Japan is the
largest donor of aid to the island countries (besides Australia), I was
interested in exploring what drives Japan’s aid policies; what were its
motives and how have these changed over time? I was surprised by what
I found. Rather than a consistent and coherent set of policy goals, Japan’s
aid program to the region has been driven by a complex and increasingly
conflicting range of objectives. This in turn has hampered the realisation of
good policies. Japan’s aid to the region has essentially evolved from being
a relatively straightforward tool of its fisheries diplomacy, to encompassing
a multiple range of interests and agendas.
It was to fisheries that my attention turned, since this is where the
story of Japan’s aid to the region began. In the late 60s and early 70s the
Pacific islands region was simultaneously transformed by two international
trends. One was the end of colonialism and the other was the introduction
in international law of the sea of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) concept. This would eventually see about 200 million sq km of
ocean come under the jurisdiction of the new political entities in the
Pacific (30 million sq km if the French and American territories are
included). This area enclosed some of Japan’s, and the world’s, most
productive tuna fishing grounds.
Japan was the leading opponent at the international level of the 200-mile
EEZ concept. Being the world’s leading fishing nation, with fleets spread
out around the oceans of the world, Japan perhaps had most to lose from
the recognition in international law of extended coastal state jurisdiction. It
thus fought hard at the international law of the sea conferences for the
principle of freedom of the seas beyond the territorial sea, which under
customary laws extended 3 miles. In 1973, while this debate was gathering
momentum internationally, the Japanese government introduced a special
category of grant aid, known as fisheries grant aid. The aid was initially
designed to entice developing countries to support the principle of freedom
of the seas.
When it became apparent by the mid-1970s that the concept of EEZs
would become part of the new law of the sea, Japan shifted its priority from
one of opposing EEZs to one of securing favourable terms of access to its
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traditional fishing grounds. Fisheries grant aid now became integral to this
new strategy.
The Japanese government had also set up in 1973 an organisation to
channel government funds to support private sector fisheries cooperation.
Known as the Overseas Fisheries Cooperation Foundation (OFCF), its
initial role was to provide soft loans to finance joint ventures between
Japanese fisheries companies and the coastal states. It later extended its
activities to other areas such as providing technical cooperation and
fisheries equipment.
The first Japanese aid to the Pacific island countries was provided in
1975—a fisheries grant to PNG. This was soon followed by fisheries grants
to other Pacific island countries that had attained independence. In the first
ten years of Japan’s aid program to the region, the share of fisheries grants
in Japan’s overall grant aid to the region was 70 per cent. For some
individual countries that share was 100 per cent.
In the same period, Japan negotiated fisheries access agreements with
seven Pacific island countries (not including the French territories). The
access fees were generally between 1 and 2 per cent of the catch value. This
was seen as inadequate by most countries and frequently agreements were
suspended in an effort to increase the rate of return, but invariably with little
success. For one thing, Japan was the dominant fishing nation at the time.
In 1981, for example, 90 per cent of foreign access fees received by the
region was paid by Japanese vessel owners. For some countries the revenue
provided by Japan was critical to their foreign exchange earnings. Pacific
island countries, in other words, had little leverage in negotiating with the
Japanese fleets.
Fisheries grant aid played a crucial role, however, in attempting to
ameliorate island dissatisfaction. It was offered as an indirect top-up to the
access fees but also used as a bargaining tool. Countries faced the prospect
of losing out on this aid if they did not conclude access agreements with
Japan.1 This tactic proved quite controversial, however, and in the early
1980s the South Pacific Forum came out strongly ‘deploring the practice
of linking aid with the receipt of fisheries access’.
An underlying problem for the region in dealing with Japan stemmed
from competitiion among themselves for access revenue and a lack of any
real scarcity value to the licences purchased. They also lacked the means
to ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of the access agreements.
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Crucial to this was ways of verifying the data provided by fishing operators,
since this data determined the amount received in fees (calculated as a rate
of return of the reported catch). There was a big problem of under-reporting
and non-reporting of catch. In addition, the Pacific island states had little
alternative but to rely on the distant water fishing operators to exploit the
tuna in their EEZs. This was because most countries lacked the fishing fleets
and processing capacity to harvest the resource themselves.
Regional machinery was set up in the late 1970s and early 1980s to be
the basis for coordinating fisheries policies and to counter some of these
weaknesses. They included the Forum Fisheries (FFA), set up in 1979, and
the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) formed in 1981. The latter is a
subregional grouping made up of countries with the largest and most
productive fishing grounds. The PNA gave rise to two management
mechanisms: the Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access (MTCs) to
apply to all agreements; and the Regional Register, which served as an
information data base on foreign fishing vessels. Although these mechanisms
provided the basis for strengthening the region’s negotiating position, they
did not actually succeed in significantly improving the situation for the island
countries, for reasons I have already mentioned. What provided the turning
point was the changing interests of one other major fishing power in the
region, the US.
The shifting balance of power
US policy (and the Kuranari Doctrine)
The mid-1980s witnessed one of those curious ironies that are not usually
apparent except with the benefit of hindsight. It was a turbulent time in the
fisheries relations between the US and the Pacific island states. American
tuna boats routinely violated the EEZs of the region, protected by US
legislation that would impose sanctions on any country that arrested these
vessels—legislation that rested on a particular interpretation of the law of
the sea governing ownership of tuna.
Geopolitical concerns then intervened and caused a shift in US
government policy. The conclusion of access agreements between two
Pacific island countries and the Soviet Union spurred the US government
into agreeing to a multilateral fisheries access agreement with the region, in
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the process agreeing to pay (through direct government subsidy) an
unprecedented rate of return of around 10 per cent. The treaty would also
provide the region (the FFA) with the most comprehensive catch and effort
data so far received and thus the means to verify the data provided by other
distant water fishing nations. The treaty was signed by the region and the
US exactly 10 years ago, in April 1987.
At the signing ceremony in Port Moresby, the idea of pursuing a similar
arrangement with Japan was mooted by the leaders gathered there. This
was endorsed at the South Pacific Forum meeting in May. What gave
impetus to these moves was not just the American agreement and the
expected benefits that would accrue to the region, but the fact that some
months earlier, in January 1987 to precise, the Japanese Foreign Minister
had visited the region and announced for the first time a special set of
principles governing Japan’s relations with the Pacific islands. This was
elevated to the status of Doctrine (named the Kuranari Doctrine after the
Foreign Minister who delivered the speech in Suva). This speech included,
amongst other things, a commitment to a dramatic increase in aid to the
region and was part of Japan’s own response to the Soviet Union’s
perceived advances.
Some Pacific island governments interpreted this initiative as a sign that
Japan would perhaps be willing to address regional concerns in the fisheries
area. It was actually argued by some governments that if Japan was really
sincere in its declaration of support for the region, it would act to improve
its fisheries agreements. But the Kuranari Doctrine was an initiative of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and fisheries policy was not included within its
ambit: fisheries policy was the concern of the Japan Fisheries Agency, who
had no interest in following the direction set by the US.
Therein lies the irony. US policy, designed to counter the Soviet Union,
had created a precedent that would change forever the nature of fisheries
agreements in the region. But the policy had most impact on Japan, and was
seen as posing a grave threat to Japanese fishing interests. Such was the
angst caused by this treaty that fisheries policy makers in Japan saw their
main threat and enemy to be the US and not the Soviet Union.
The immediate effects of the US treaty were twofold: to raise
expectations for similar arrangements with other distant water fishing
nations (namely Japan); and to raise expectations for improvement in
bilateral fisheries agreements. Countries had greater confidence in dealing
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with Japan and in pushing for higher access fees, and there was far
greater instability in Japan’s fishing agreements as a consequence. The
most significant casualty of the US multilateral agreement was Japan’s
access agreement with PNG. This had been Japan’s most important
fishing partner in the region until 1987 when the agreement lapsed and
protracted negotiations failed to resolve differences over the rate of
return. Despite threats and inducements (relating to fisheries grant aid) the
PNG government stood firm on its position that it would not accept less
than a 6 per cent rate of return.2
If Japanese fisheries policy makers had cause to resent US policy on
the multilateral access agreement, they had even more cause to resent US
policy a few years later when the issue of driftnetting swept through the
region. The Pacific island countries were successful in securing an end to
large-scale driftnetting in the high seas of the south Pacific. The targets of
the campaign were Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. But crucial to putting
an end to this fishing practice was US pressure on Japan, due to its own
campaign against north Pacific driftnetting, and the threat of trade sanctions
invoked by US legislation. Japan’s diplomatic isolation was also a significant
factor (its only allies were other driftnetting nations, none of whom carried
much clout). The Japanese government was forced to sacrifice the
driftnetting industry, in the interests of ‘international cooperation’.
The US has also put pressure on Japan (and other distant water fishing
nations) since the late 1980s to curtail tuna fishing where there is a level of
interaction with dolphin. This resulted from US government policies of
‘dolphin-safe tuna’ This has led to bans on tuna purse seining in the eastern
tropical Pacific and contributed to the influx of tuna purse seiners into the
central western pacific.
Increased competition for access
This leads to discussion of another factor that has caused a shift in the
balance of power between Pacific island coastal states and Japan: the
increased competition among distant water fishing nations for access to the
region’s fishing grounds. The trend in recent years has been increasing
demand and shrinking supply. Gone are the days when Japanese fleets
dominated the fishing grounds of the region. Although Japan still dominates
the pole and line fishery and the frozen long line fishery, China and Taiwan
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dominate the fresh long line fishery while in the purse seine fishery, the fleets
of the US, Taiwan and Korea all compete with Japan. This growing
competition has in some cases led to open conflict between the fleets of
various countries. For example, there have been allegations that Chinese
long liners are cutting the lines of Japanese vessels.
Competition for access has put upward pressure on access fees. Japan
has been forced to address the fact that all other distant water fishing nations
are paying a higher rate of return than Japanese fleets. While some of these
other countries (Taiwan and Korea) might cheat more and thus in reality pay
less, they do at least agree to pay around a 6 per cent rate of return. Japan
has argued in the past that a 4 percent rate of return was the maximum its
industry could afford. In recent years it has shifted this break-even point to
5 per cent. Given the economic difficulties most Japanese fleets face, they
probably could not afford much more than between 6 and 8 per cent.
Further, given the lack of substantial political support for the industry in
Japan, it is unlikely that they would receive a direct government subsidy, the
kind the US tuna industry receives from the US government. This has
caused the fishing industry to rely on indirect subsidies, mainly fisheries aid.
Japan introduced more innovative forms of fisheries aid (OFCF aid and
small scale fisheries grant aid). It also agreed to comply with various
regional management mechanisms in the region, which previously it has
resisted. This leads to the third main area of change that has affected Pacific
island relations with Japan: shifts in international norms on conservation and
management of fisheries, in favour of coastal states.
Issues of conservation and management
The issue of driftnetting was, in a way, a prelude to a move by a number
of large coastal states (e.g. Canada) to attempt to extend control over high
seas areas, adjacent to the EEZs, in an effort to protect their own resources
from over-fishing. In fact, the reason Japan had objected so strongly to the
ban on driftnetting in the South Pacific was that it did not want to allow a
precedent under which coastal states control fishing activities on the high
seas. It was also against allowing the imposition of moratoria on fishing
activities (regarding them as being based on emotional factors rather than
scientific evidence). It saw this ban on driftnetting as perhaps presaging
more broad based moratoria, which could threaten supplies of tuna and
cause prices to spiral upwards.
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Beyond these concerns was an even more contentious issue: the
question of the rights of fishing nations versus coastal states, especially in
the management of such highly migratory species as tuna. Japan has always
maintained that under the Law of Sea Convention, all states must cooperate
in the management of the resource. This implies that they must join together
in management organisations. Japan for a long time refused to recognise or
deal with the FFA because it included only Pacific island states (and
Australia and NZ).
Pacific island countries, on the other hand, claimed sovereign rights
to the tuna within their EEZs and did not see any obligation under the law
of the sea to join in a broad based management regime with Japan. For the
most part this was because they distrusted Japan’s motives and felt that
their interests were not compatible with those of Japan and other distant
water fishing nations. It is also true, however, that under the law of the
sea, provisions relating to the management of highly migratory stocks
were ambiguous.
At the 1992 UNCED Conference in Rio it was agreed by the international
community that action needed to be taken to elaborate and strengthen those
parts of the law of the sea relating to highly migratory fish stocks (e.g. tuna)
and straddling fish stocks. This presented an opportunity for both Japan and
the Pacific island states to press their respective positions and to influence
international law in their favour. A conference was convened at the UN in
1993 and lasted until 1995. (It was chaired by Fiji’s diplomat and leading law
of the sea expert, Satya Nandan.)
In the lead-up to this conference Pacific island countries teamed up
with other so-called ‘like minded states’, forming coalitions to help push
their positions on the law of the sea. These coalitions included other
powerful coastal states (Canada and the US). It is important to note once
again the role of the US as an ally of the Pacific island states against Japan.
It supported the codification in international law of the ‘precautionary
approach’. This is what the ban on driftnetting has been based on. It states
that ‘where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’. The burden of
proof that fishing is not harming the resource lies with the fishing nation,
not the coastal state.
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The US also supported the elaboration in international law of greater flag
state responsibility. Fishing nations had to be more vigilant in ensuring that
their vessels abided by responsible fishing practices. If they were unable,
or failed, to ensure this then other countries could step in and take action
against an offending vessel. (In fact, in 1994 the US government and the
FFA had entered into an agreement relating to fisheries monitoring and
surveillance in the central and western Pacific. This allows for exchange of
information and intelligence regarding fishing vessel activities in the region.
It also allows for the US to take action, according to its own laws, against
vessels found to be in violation of regional conservation laws.)
But the new agreement of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, which opened for signature at the UN in December 1995,
also calls on coastal states to cooperate more substantially with distant
water fishing nations in regional fisheries arrangements. Now that the
Law of the Sea Convention has been formally ratified (in November 1994)
states are obligated to abide by its provisions. To a certain extent this
legitimises Japan’s long-standing call for a broad based fisheries organisation
in the region.
Recognising these obligations, the Pacific island countries are now
embarking on the complex and difficult task of resolving (together with the
fishing nations of the region) exactly where their rights begin and end: how
to balance their rights to manage the tuna within their EEZs with the
requirement that there be cooperation among all states ‘with a real interest
in the fishery’ in the management of the resource. In June [1997], in the
Marshall Islands, a pivotal meeting will take place between the Pacific island
states and fishing nations to try to resolve precisely this issue. This is not
expected to be conclusive: rather, it is part of a long, ongoing process.
Regional strategies
In this final section of the paper I want to assess regional strategies that
have worked in the interests of the region in dealing with Japan on
fisheries matters.
First, the situation in the mid-1990s. There seems to be a marked
improvement in the relationship between Japan and the region. There have
been incremental increases in access fees (on average 5 per cent), more
innovative types of fisheries aid (including small-scale fisheries grants,
OFCF aid and aid for environmental conservation) and greater compliance
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with regional management and conservation measures, including recognition
of the FFA. There are still problems, of course. Access agreements still get
suspended because of disagreements over the access fee. There are still
major differences over future management and conservation measures in
the region. But we have come a long way.
What has worked in Pacific island countries’ favour are three broad
trends: US interests changed; the balance of supply and demand changed;
and international norms changed.
Pacific island countries, through a combination of foresight, opportunism
and coincidence, have taken advantage of these changes and successfully
utilised a number of regional strategies. The following are the ones that I
believe have had most impact on relations with Japan:
Using US pressure on Japan, both directly and indirectly.  It is well known
that Japan often takes action (that is does not want to take) only when it is
pressured to do so. The term ‘reactive state’ was coined to explain this
phenomenon. And the principal source of influence on Japan has long been
the US. US policy on the multilateral access agreement was an indirect
source of pressure on Japan. It compelled Japan to improve bilateral access
agreements, partly as a way of countering moves for a similar multilateral
agreement between Japan and the region. In 1992 the Pacific islands and the
US governments agreed to an extension of the multilateral access agreement
for a further 10 years, on improved terms and conditions. US policy on
driftnetting and on management and conservation measures in general has
been a much more direct source of pressure on Japan.
Playing off the competing interests of the distant water fishing nations for
access to the region’s tuna. There has been a turning of the tables, so to
speak, in that previously it was the fishing nations (especially Japan) who
played off the competing interests of the island states and thus managed to
keep fees low. In recent years the region has exploited this increased
demand by putting in place various limited licensing arrangements. The
most important are the Palau Arrangement and the Federated States of
Micronesia Agreement. Both came into force in 1995. Under the Palau
Arrangement there will be a 10 per cent reduction in the number of foreign
purse seine licences issued, starting in 1997. And in licensing foreign
vessels, priority will be given to those that demonstrate compliance with
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Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access (MTCs) as well as supporting
tuna industry development in the region.
Forging coalitions at the international level with other ‘like-minded states’
to put in place, or to codify in international law, norms and principles that
promote more responsible fishing practices. This in turn has been crucial
to legitimising (and thereby ensuring Japanese compliance with) various
regional arrangements that have been adopted in order to increase the
benefits of foreign licensing agreements and enhance conservation measures.
These include the MTCs, which were strengthened in 1992, the Regional
Register and the regional Vessel Monitoring System. The MTCs require,
among other things, that foreign vessel owners carry (and pay costs of)
observers, refrain from transshipping their catch at sea (including on the
high seas), and include high seas catch data when fishing trips involved both
in-zone and high-seas fishing.
Strengthening regional institutions and regimes might seem somewhat
obvious, but a key to the success of the region’s fisheries diplomacy rests
on the laying of different regional arrangements, which in turn reinforce and
strengthen each other. This makes it more difficult for fishing nations to
ignore or water-down management measures. This may even accomplish
what would be impossible or unlikely because of conflicting national
interests among island states.
The failure to conclude a multilateral access agreement with Japan
illustrates this point. The attempts to conclude such a multilateral agreement
were unsuccessful partly because of strong opposition by Japan and partly
also because of a marked preference on the part of some island states for
existing bilateral arrangements. But the 1990s have seen a flurry of regional
diplomacy and the conclusion of various agreements among FFA and PNA
member countries relating to surveillance, conservation and management.
These have been imposed on Jpan, as a condition of access, and have
achieved, to some extent, the goals of a multilateral access agreement with
Japan.3 The issue that remain outstanding is the rate of return.
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What has been the driving force of this regionalism?
Two factors can be identified as driving this regionalism.
1 There has been a recognition of common interests and the will to pursue
these collectively has emerged. This does not exist across the board when
it comes to dealing with Japan, as the experience with a multilateral access
agreement demonstrated. Regional diplomacy is still largely driven by
pragmatic considerations.
2 The  proactive role of the FFA has been crucial to the regional strategies
that have been used in dealing with Japan. But this highlights a number of
dilemmas, most notably the question of the extent to which it is national
governments or the regional organisations that should take the lead, but also
the question of who in these organisations is shaping regional policies. The
membership of FFA includes Australia and New Zealand. It is no secret that
these two countries are very influential in that organisation and this is one
factor that has influenced Japan’s antipathy in the past towards of FFA.
A not-so-dispassionate conclusion
The achievements of regionalism in the past in helping to turn the tables on
Japan should not be allowed to lead to complacency when it comes to
regional fisheries matters. If anything, we are entering a period of even
greater trial and uncertainty.
On the one hand, we need to ensure that future negotiations on fisheries
management arrangements in the region are conducted from a position of
strength, and this requires regional solidarity. While all states (coastal and
fishing) have a common interest in ensuring the sustainable use of the
resource, we do not share common views with the fishing nations
(particularly Japan) on how this could be achieved. Island countries,
therefore, need to ensure they do not lose ground in these negotiations.
On the other hand, there is the ongoing issue of how to maximise
economic benefits for the people of the Pacific from their tuna resource.
Some island countries think this is best achieved by going it alone (i.e. that
their economic returns are greater from bilateral fisheries agreements and
associated joint ventures/aid programmes). To the extent that this is so, it
should also be recognised that what has helped make bilateral arrangements
more profitable and worthwhile is the combined political clout of the region,
acting collectively.
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Moreover, the only way to ensure that these economic returns continue
in the future is by putting in place the management regimes that will protect
our rights to the resources and protect our heritage. In other words, national
self-interests and regional interests are two sides of the same coin.
Notes
Originally given as an Oceania Lecture at the University of the South Pacific, 9 April
1997.
1 It should be noted that although the Japanese government did not directly
subsidise the access fees of the Japanese industry, fisheries grant aid was a form of
indirect subsidy. In addition, the OFCF (which was an organisation promoting
private sector cooperation) did give aid, known as goods and services, to the island
states as part of the cost of access. Normally this amounted to about 10 per cent of
the access fee. Island governments would have preferred to receive all the fee in cash,
but they did not have much say in the matter. The only country that did manage to
exclude this goods and services component from the access fee was PNG. But then
PNG, being much less dependent on the revenue from licence fees and fisheries grant
aid, was in a much stronger position than other Pacific island countries.
2 The negotiations that took place between 1987 and 1990 between PNG and
Japan are interesting for a number of reasons, not least because they revealed
differences between Japanese policy makers (namely between Fisheries Agency
policy makers and those from the Foreign Ministry) especially relating to
interpretations of fisheries grant aid policy. There were also differences between
fisheries policy makers and representatives of industry. The latter were more willing
to make a deal, but had to go along with the government policy makers, who were
more interested in making an example of, punishing, PNG.
3 Some countries (e.g. FSM and Kiribati) have indicated their preference for
existing bilateral arrangements. These are Japan’s most important fishing partners
and they benefit from a concentration of Japanese fishing effort in their waters. A
multilateral agreement (whatever form it takes) would inevitably open up more
EEZs to Japanese fleets and probably lead to a redistribution of fishing effort by
Japan; leading perhaps to a reduction in access fees received by these countries. This
is what had happened when the US multilateral treaty was put into effect and
interestingly enough, the main beneficiary of that treaty was PNG (who has also
been the leading proponent among Pacific island countries of a multilateral access
agreement with Japan). It appears that the FFA has shelved, for now, the idea of a
multilateral access agreement with Japan.
